

UB 343

.A5

1917d

Copy 2

FT MEADE
GenColl





INCREASE OF THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT.

APRIL 21, 1917.—Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union and ordered to be printed.

Mr. DENT, from the Committee on Military Affairs, submitted the following

REPORT.

[To accompany H. R. 3545.]

The Committee on Military Affairs, to whom was referred the bill H. R. 3545) to authorize the President to increase temporarily the Military Establishment of the United States, having considered the same, report thereon with a recommendation that it do pass with the following committee amendments:

Line 8, page 3, insert the word "in" after the word "accept."

Line 12, page 3, substitute the word "four" for the word "fourth."

Line 17, page 3, insert the word "and" after the word "population."

Line 19, page 3, substitute the word "now" for the word "already."

Line 24, page 3, substitute the word "shall" for the word "to."

Line 25, page 3, strike out "enrollment" and insert "registration."

Line 1, page 4, between the words "in" and "this" insert "section 4 of."

Line 3, page 4, strike out the words "and maintained."

End of section 2, page 7, add the following paragraph: "Organizations of the forces herein provided for, except the Regular Army, shall, as far as the interest of the service permit, be composed of men who come, and of officers who are appointed, from the same State or locality."

Line 22, page 9, insert the word "State" for the word "local."

Line 15, page 10, strike out the word "proper" and insert after the word "States" the following: "having jurisdiction thereof."

Line 19, page 10, strike out the words "enrollment or."

Line 22, page 10, strike out the word "preference" and insert "precedence."

Line 4, page 12, strike out the word "proper."

Line 5, page 12, insert after "States" the following: "having jurisdiction thereof."

Line 12, page 12, before the word "recruits" insert the word "such."

WB P. 5
1917

In explanation of the bill the majority of the committee submits the following statement:

This bill authorizes in the first paragraph of the first section the increase of the Regular Army to war strength. This is the present law without this paragraph. It was thought, however, better that it should be reenacted so as to have all the law for the raising of a temporary force in one bill. A modification of the law relative to the provisional appointments made under section 23 of the national defense act is made for the purpose of authorizing the War Department to determine an officer's unfitness before the expiration of the full two years. If enlistments in the Regular Army are filled up according to the authorization of this paragraph, the Regular Army would have about 287,000 men.

The second paragraph authorizes the draft of the National Guard up to war strength. This is already authorized by section 111 of the national defense act, but is reenacted for the same purpose as the first paragraph. The preservation of the organizations or units of the National Guard of their State designations is provided for as far as practicable. This would authorize an increase to about 625,000. The third paragraph authorizes a call for 500,000 volunteers under the act of April 25, 1914, and an additional force of 500,000 if it should become necessary. Such volunteer army is apportioned among the States and Territories according to population, and raised in units of not higher than that of a regiment. It also provides that the volunteer forces shall be recruited in local units as far as practicable and company officers appointed from such units upon passing such reasonable examination as to fitness as the President may direct. It gives the President full authority to refuse to accept or to discharge from the service all persons designated in the exemption section, known as section 3. It provides that upon the completion of the registration and in the event the President decides that such additional force shall not have been effectually raised under the call for volunteers the President may raise by selective draft such additional forces of 500,000 each. This force may be officered by ordering members of the Officers' Reserve Corps to temporary duty, in accordance with section 38 of the national defense act; by appointment from the Regular Army, the Officers' Reserve Corps, from those qualified and registered pursuant to section 23 of the act of January 21, 1903; from members of the National Guard drafted into the service; from those who have been graduated from educational institutions at which military instruction is compulsory; from those who have had honorable service in the Regular Army, National Guard, or volunteer forces; from the country at large by assigning retired officers to active duty; or by the appointment of retired officers; and enlisted men, active or retired, of the Regular Army.

The fourth paragraph authorizes the raising and training of an additional force of 500,000 in the same manner as provided in the third paragraph.

The fifth paragraph authorizes the raising by volunteers or draft of recruit training units. The sixth authorizes the raising of such number of ammunition batteries and battalions, depot batteries and battalions, and such artillery parks, with such numbers and grades of personnel as the President may deem necessary. Enlisted men may be assigned to such organizations from the forces herein provided for.

D. of D.

APR 30 1917

Section 2 authorizes the raising of the Regular Army and the National Guard to maximum strength by volunteer enlistment, but gives the President authority, if he decides that they can not be effectually so raised and maintained, to resort to the selective draft. The draft fixes liability to military service upon all male citizens between the ages of 21 and 40 years, except alien enemies. Quotas from the several States and Territories shall be determined according to population and credit is given to every State and Territory for the number of men in the military service as members of the National Guard who were in the service on April 2, 1917, or who have since that date entered the service. The President is also authorized by voluntary enlistment or by draft to raise special and technical troops as he may deem necessary.

Section 3 provides for the exemption classes.

Section 4 provides for the registration of all persons between the ages of 21 and 40, and a penalty for failure to register.

Section 5 authorizes the use of all departments, officials, and agents of the various States and of the United States in the execution of the act.

Section 6 provides that qualifications and conditions for voluntary enlistment, except as to age limit, which is made from 18 to 40, shall be the same as those prescribed for enlistment in the Regular Army, and that all enlistments are for the period of the emergency. The President is authorized to discharge any enlisted man who has a dependent family. It also authorizes the employment on active duty of retired enlisted men of the Regular Army.

Section 7 authorizes the President to appoint for the emergency general officers for duty with brigades, divisions, and higher units. Vacancies in any grade of the Regular Army due to the appointment of officers to higher grades shall be filled in accordance with section 114 of the national-defense act.

Section 8 provides that appointments provided by the second, third, fourth, fifth, and sixth paragraphs of section 1 and by section 7, and the temporary appointments in the Regular Army authorized by the first paragraph, shall be for the period of the emergency. This section also authorizes the discharge of such officers by the President.

Section 9 provides that the pay of officers and enlisted men to be the same as that of the Regular Army.

Section 10 carries an appropriation of \$3,000,000,000 to carry this act into effect. This is a lump sum estimated to be necessary for 43,000 officers and 1,018,270 enlisted men. An estimate of these expenses may be found in the hearings before the Committee on Military Affairs April 7, 1917, pages 165 to 183, inclusive.

Section 11 suspends all existing restrictions upon the detail of officers and enlisted men.

Section 12 provides for the suspension of all laws and parts of laws in conflict with this act for the period of this emergency.

INCREASE OF THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT.

APRIL 21, 1917.—Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union and ordered to be printed.

VIEWS OF THE MINORITY.

[To accompany H. R. 3545.]

We, the undersigned members of the Committee on Military Affairs of the House of Representatives, feel we can not support the views of the majority of the committee on the bill (H. R. 3545) to authorize the President to increase temporarily the Military Establishment of the United States, and more especially to paragraph 3, section 1, which is that feature of the bill providing a volunteer military force as against a force based on a system of universal obligation to service or selective conscription. The objection to the volunteer system is forcefully and succinctly set forth in the following letter of the Secretary of War to the chairman of the Committee on Military Affairs of the House. It reads:

APRIL 17, 1917.

MY DEAR MR. DENT: I do not know how accurate the account in this morning's Post may be as to the present opinion of the House Committee on Military Affairs, but I think I ought to ask you to read this letter to the committee, as I have a deep conviction that any compromise of the principles governing the bill submitted by the department for the raising of a new army would be attended by unfortunate results.

The bill as drawn preserves so much of the volunteer spirit as can be preserved without embarking on the experiment of a mixed system of draft and volunteering. It makes place for several hundred thousand men above the age of 25 who may be moved to volunteer, and by equalizing the terms and condition of service in the Regular Army, National Guard, and additional forces gives such volunteers entire equality with all others in the national forces.

The drafting provision starts at the outset a process by which the forces of the country can be called as they shall be needed, according to an equal and just system, and it has these merits:

1. It spreads the burden of military preparation equally throughout the United States.

2. It is certain in its operation, so that after the registration is made every man in the country will know whether he is to be called and when he is to be called upon, allowing those who are not to be called, or whose call is postponed, to continue their normal pursuits undisturbed by uncertainty as to their duty and unagitated by neighborhood pressure or misunderstanding.

3. It starts at the beginning of the accumulation of these new forces, and has none of the character of a penalty which attaches to the draft when it is used after volunteering has been tried and failed.

I have studied every report I can secure of the use of the volunteer system abroad and in our own country, and I believe it to be true that in every place where it has been tried, whatever success it has had has been due to a system of compulsions more harassing and almost as drastic as the provisions of a law itself. Old men and young and old women have united to urge young men to volunteer, appealing to local and State pride, and have enforced their appeal by social ostracisms, by pinning yellow ribbons on the coats of young men, and by epithets and outcries which have finally driven the reluctant into the ranks, and humiliated both the ready and the reluctant by the methods used.

Such objection as there has been to the draft has, in nearly all cases, been due to the fact that it came as an exercise of the superior power of the Government after a fruitless appeal to the volunteer spirit.

In the countries of Europe where the volunteer system has obtained, those responsible for it were excused because they could not have foreseen at the beginning the results, but we have their experience to guide us, and I believe that those responsible in this country for repeating the costly errors which have been made abroad will not be able to make that explanation.

I beg, Mr. Chairman, that you and your associates will realize that I am deeply in earnest in this matter. With the greatest deference to the rights and independence of judgment of your committee and the House, I still feel obliged as Secretary of War, and therefore your responsible adviser on this subject, to urge the passage of the bill as drawn. This is the greatest war in the history of the world. Our participation in it is as yet undetermined in many of its modes and wholly as to its duration and extent, but we are called upon to inaugurate a system which, in any event or contingency, will place our country in a situation where it can contribute the trained men and the means necessary to bring this war to a conclusion which will mean a vindication of the principles upon which we entered it. We must, therefore, prepare to array the Nation, not by haphazard means, and (if I may say so without offense) not by volunteering, either of persons or of property, but by an ordered, systematic devotion of every man and every resource of our Nation to the task, and this can be done only by placing upon the statute books of the Nation a system which assigns to our people each his part according to his strength, and which leads them to forego, in the interest of the common cause, all pride as to method and preference as to service, allowing the organized agencies of our democratic Government to judge where each can best serve his country.

In conclusion, I beg to assure you that I have no alarm on the subject of militarism in America, and particularly no alarm of any such consequence from the pending measure, temporary as it is, and designed for this emergency. Militarism is a philosophy; it is the designation given to a selfish or ambitious political system which uses arms as a means of accomplishing its objects. The mobilization and arming of a democracy in defense of the principles upon which it is founded and in vindication of the common rights of men in the world is an entirely different thing, and both the people of the United States and the people of the world will be inspired to see that we are brave enough and far-sighted enough to lay our peace-time preferences aside in the interest of that form of common effort which will most certainly and most speedily accomplish our national purpose.

If the members of your committee, prior to a final decision, will permit me, it will give me great pleasure to appear before them again and to urge more at large the convictions which I have here sought to press upon their attention.

Respectfully, yours,

NEWTON D. BAKER, *Secretary of War.*

Hon. S. H. DENT, Jr.,

*Chairman Committee on Military Affairs,
House of Representatives.*

The bill as originally forwarded to the chairman of the Committee on Military Affairs was drafted in the War Department and has the approval of the Commander in Chief of the Army, his civilian representative, the Secretary of War, and the officers of the General Staff and the Staff Corps. The military officers are the experts of the Government in military matters. It is to them the Nation will look for the organization and the conduct in the field of our armies in the present war. The study of military plans and problems constitutes their life work. On the other hand the members of the Committee on Military Affairs are laymen. They are not military

men. And yet the majority of the committee have seen fit to set their own views on the raising of the proper military forces for the successful conduct of the war above the views of the trained military experts of the Government. In this great crisis we deem it to be our patriotic duty in this matter of increasing temporarily the Military Establishment of the United States to follow the counsel of the Commander in Chief of our Army and his expert advisers. We desire to follow the plan which they have laid down for us in this matter rather than follow any plan which we ourselves might devise.

The experience of the North and of the South with the volunteer system during the Civil War should recur to us with appealing conviction at this time. Both sides had to resort to conscription before the war ended. The South in the first year of the war and the North in its second year. When volunteering did not bring recruits as rapidly as was desired, the laws putting the draft into operation were enacted. The conscript was often looked upon with contempt. If the principle of universal obligation to service had been invoked in the beginning, and the willing and unwilling citizens had gone into the Army together at the outset under the same law, there would never have arisen the discrimination between the willing and the unwilling soldier that was brought into being by the fact that part of the soldiers volunteered and part were conscripted. As it was, it was felt that the conscript had to be forced into the service of his country, and ever since that period the word "conscription" has carried with it a meaning of reproach.

If the majority plan were adopted at this time and should again prove a failure, the conscript would once more be looked upon with disfavor. If, on the other hand, the legislation that is enacted provides for selective conscription, every citizen of the Republic will know that those who have been selected have been called to the colors by their country as a universal obligation to serve in the hour of the Nation's need.

In the present world war, England, whose military system had been somewhat similar to our own, resorted to all kinds of expedients to furnish the necessary troops she required under the volunteer system. It is asserted by those who favor the latter system that in England the Government was enabled to recruit upward of 5,000,000 volunteers before they resorted to conscription. They fail, however, to tell how those volunteers were secured. They fail to point out the compelling influence on hesitating minds of the extensive advertising campaign through the distribution of hundreds of thousands of derisive colored posters throughout the United Kingdom. They fail to speak of the insults that were visited upon the heads of those unfortunate Englishmen who did not immediately, or who could not finally, respond. They fail to tell of such indignities as thrusting white feathers into the hands of young men and pinning yellow ribbons to their coat tails in the attempt to brand them as "slackers." They fail to mention the campaign of anonymous letters to drive men into the volunteer forces. They fail to speak of the social ostracism that was resorted to in order to force men to volunteer. And these same tactics were similarly employed in Canada and Australia in the effort to force men to volunteer for the war.

After two years of the volunteer system England was compelled for her own protection to adopt a system of "universal obligation to

service," which is but another name for selective conscription. Before the latter system was adopted she went through various stages of experience, each stage entailing long discussion, considerable delay, and the cost of many men and much treasure. It is generally accepted in England to-day that if she had adopted universal obligation to serve at the very outset of the war that country would be in a much better position than she is at present. Capt. Benson, of the Somerset Yeomanry, testified before the Committee on Military Affairs, on April 14, and stated the reasons why his country came to adopt the selective conscription system. We quote from his testimony as follows:

The democracy of England really forced on this universal military obligation. We do not like calling it conscription over there. There were about five reasons, I think, that forced it. The first was that the democracy there argued that the State gave equal privileges to every man and that the obligation should also be equal, and that the voluntary system savored of privilege, because A and B come up and enlist and C and D do not. The argument was that why should A and B bear an obligation that C and D do not bear when their privileges of citizenship are exactly alike. That was one of the greatest arguments, and that was forced chiefly by the Labor Party and by the mass of public opinion.

The second reason was that it was evident after a time that universal obligation secured infinitely greater efficiency because the State, if it has every man of military age under an obligation to do his duty by the State, can tell him exactly what to do; and under our volunteer system at the beginning of the war thousands of men from the coal mines, the shipbuilding yards, mechanics and farm laborers, enlisted and went out. Those men were skilled to a very great extent. Afterwards, when urgent necessity for those men came, we had to withdraw a great many men from the front line and bring them back to the workshops where they were urgently necessary. Of course, under a system of universal obligation the State can simply say, "You stay in the workshop, and you go." In other words, A and B were very often the coal miners and the farm laborers, and C and D were perhaps men selling ribbons in a woman's dressmaking shop where they would not have been missed nor upset the military effort.

The third point was economy; and this, as a matter of fact, came under my own view. Very often A and B, who enlisted, were married men with large families, while C and D were single men. say. While those men were on service the State had to pay separation allowances and dependent allowances for A's and B's wives and children and dependents, and those allowances were a very serious factor. In fact, it was laughingly said that if a man only had enough children his pay would be as much as the pay of a general, and that was a factor that had great weight. In one case I was told to enlist a squadron for certain purposes, and these men were just civilian laborers. They were given 25 shillings a week. The very day we put them into uniform, on account of the fact that it was under the volunteer system and we took all men who came, married or single, the pay list went up the very next week by 87 per cent on account of the separation allowances for children, etc. There is no doubt about the efficiency and economy of the system of universal military obligation. You can then choose the single men and reject the married men with large families and big dependencies, and if a man is injured, in the case of a single man you have no separation allowances to pay to his wife and children, and if he is killed, you have no pension to pay. It is very, very extravagant, they found in England, to take any man who comes, because you will not be able to pick and choose, and the only way you can pick and choose is simply to say, "You are all equally liable."

The fourth thing which I think drove the people to it was continuity of effort, and that was a very important thing. They have found during the war that there was always in England an anxiety as to how many men you could get at a certain time, and I think undoubtedly that affected some of their efforts. If we could have pressed home our advantage with a large number of men, we might have been very much better off, but as it was, you had to look at the recruiting, and you would see in the papers that the recruiting was bad or good this week. When the Zeppelins came over Scarborough, or something of that sort happened, it would be good. By universal obligation you can look down your list and groups and categories and say that on January 1 I will have so many men if I want them, and it is a very great thing for military effort to have such continuity, so you can look ahead and make your plans,

just as it is, as you gentlemen know, in any other business, if you can only look ahead.

The fifth reason was that a great many men would go because they were forced by public opinion to go, and very often, as I have said, married men who perhaps ought not to have gone enlisted. There were other men who did not go, and they were called slackers; but a great many men were called slackers who were not slackers at all. They said that the unmarried men ought to go first. Now, since we have had in England universal obligation to serve, the word "slacker" and other terms of opprobrium of that kind have disappeared. Every man goes when he is asked to step in and fulfill his obligations in return for the privileges he has received.

The sixth point is equal distribution of effort and obligation. In other words, we know that in some districts, which I shall not name, recruits have come in to a tremendous extent, and they would always come in from those places that had been bombarded by Zeppelins, while other districts would not send any recruits at all. I imagine that you would find the same condition in this country. By bringing in this universal obligation, it means that you can have an equal distribution of effort and obligation throughout the whole country, and you would be meeting the situation fairly. I think that that is really the feeling that forced the democracy of England to claim this universal obligation from the Government, and it is now working absolutely well. While there were many people who were very much against it at first, I think now the people are overwhelmingly in favor of it.

Some of those who favor the volunteer system point with pride to the fact that 1,000 volunteers are enlisting every day at the present time. According to a letter from the Secretary of War to the chairman of the committee, 724,718 volunteers will be required for our Regular Army and the National Guard organizations. It would therefore take 724 days, including Sundays, or about 2 years, to get the volunteer forces required for these two branches alone of our military establishment. Does that look very hopeful? Another argument that is put forth by those in favor of the volunteer system is that we will get an army of 500,000 men quickly. The testimony of the Secretary of War before the committee shows that the department will not be able to equip 500,000 men for several months. If enlistments under the volunteer system were to begin at once and were to continue as rapidly as the most sanguine partisan of that system could desire we would not be able to equip such a force at the present time. Our failure in that direction would necessarily discourage enlistments, and eventually we would have to fill even the Regular Army and the National Guard organizations by the draft system. Nor is that the only difficulty. It will take many months to select and train the necessary officers for such a force. Without proper officers the enlisted personnel under the most favorable circumstances would be little more than a disorganized mob.

The plan of the minority, on the other hand, embraces volunteer enlistments for the Regular Army and the National Guard organizations which are already in existence under our laws. Concurrently with such enlistments we would provide immediately for an additional force of 500,000 men under the principle of universal obligation to service or selective conscription. Under that plan we would know exactly how many men we could depend on at any particular time for fighting the battles of this war. The volunteer system would always carry in its train an element of uncertainty. It is our judgment that the volunteer system is not a fair one. It is neither equitable nor democratic. In this Republic every American should esteem it an honor to bear his share of the country's burdens. That can only be done under the principle of universal obligation to serve. In our opinion it is for the nation, not the individual, to determine what service the citizen should render.

Of the eight members of the Military Affairs Committee signing this minority report, four saw actual service in the Volunteer Army during the Spanish-American War, and one of these saw additional service during the Mexican border trouble. They have knowledge at first hand of the inefficiency of the volunteer system and they all join in this report protesting against the evils of that system and in favor of a system based on universal obligation to service.

JULIUS KAHN.

JOHN C. MCKENZIE.

FRANK L. GREENE.

RICHARD OLNEY, 2d.

JOHN Q. TILSON.

THOMAS S. CRAGO.

THOMAS W. HARRISON.

GEORGE R. LUNN.

INCREASE OF THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT.

APRIL 21, 1917.—Committed to the Committee of the whole House on the state of the Union and ordered to be printed.

MINORITY VIEWS BY MR. CALDWELL.

[To accompany H. R. 3545.]

I am in favor of the draft feature of this bill, and feel that it should be put in operation at the earliest possible moment. The words draft and conscription have come to have an odium given to them by the unfortunate use of the draft method only after a sufficient force could not be obtained to meet the requirements by volunteer enlistment. No such odium will attach if the draft is put into operation while the volunteers are coming in large numbers.

The bill makes it necessary to try out the volunteer system or declare it a failure before the draft can be put into operation. The volunteer provision is permissive only, but it leaves no other course open to raise the army we need now until volunteering has been tried and found unsatisfactory.

There is a large number of men of military age who have had military training in this or some other country, who can be spared from their civil pursuits, and who would be glad to volunteer for this emergency if they could do so without joining the Regulars or the National Guard. The bill will close the doors to these men if they are above the age of the selection (probably 26) and result in the loss of their services in the military arm, but this will not be as serious a loss as would come through delay, dissension, or division.

I have pressed this view upon the Secretary of War and upon the President, and my only answer has been that they thought that the situation could be best met by confining the volunteers to the Regulars and the National Guard.

There is much force in the argument that it is traditional with the English-speaking race to fight its wars with volunteers; that we should start our wars with a willing army, and that each individual was best able to judge for himself what particular line of endeavor he should best pursue in the defense of his country. But this is no ordinary war and should be approached with the hope that it will not last long, but with the intention of providing for the worst that

could happen, namely, a long war, so therefore conscription at the outset is the logical answer.

Under the circumstances and because the delay that must necessarily occur in the final passage of the bill carrying any kind of a provision recognizing volunteers, I am constrained to believe that the best interests of the country will be subserved by striking from the bill the provision of subdivision third of section 1, authorizing the President to call for volunteers, and the proviso accompanying same.

Respectfully submitted.

CHAS. POPE CALDWELL.

APRIL 21, 1917.

○

1575

MD 3






DOBBS BROS.
LIBRARY BINDING

SEP 72
ST. AUGUSTINE
FLA.



32084

LIBRARY OF CONGRESS



0 020 128 394 2